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Archive for the ‘Stellenbosch’ Category

Writing a biography of an uncharted people

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Biography

Two weeks ago, early on the Tuesday morning while still in bed, I opened my laptop to start the day. I was staying in a guest house in Guelph, Canada, where I was on a short visit before heading off to the Economic History Association meetings in San José at the end of that week. Scanning through my mails, my eyes came to rest on an address I had expected – an email from our Development and Alumni Relations officer. It read only: ‘Geluk Johan!’ – ‘Congratulations Johan!’ Our Mellon application was successful. The Biography of an Uncharted People project had begun.

The idea for the Mellon project had started roughly a year earlier. South Africa’s individual-level census data for much of the period before 1948 has not been preserved, and economic history is increasingly moving towards understanding ‘history from below’, using large datasets to investigate the social, demographic and economic aspects of human behaviour in the past. Fortunately, large numbers of other types of individual-level records have been preserved in South Africa’s archives, and are increasingly being digitised by institutions such as FamilySearch.org. These records include things like marriage records, death notices, voters’ rolls, tax censuses and slave emancipation records. Using such source material, I believe, would have two main benefits: firstly, it would open many new avenues for historical inquiry and, secondly, it would help equip history students with the skills of the data revolution, something I’ve written about before.

Dyanti Ngcita

An example of a Cape province death certificate

But transcription is expensive. The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, however, is a generous supporter of research in the humanities, and after a rigorous internal and external application process, with many excellent competing project bids, we received, on that wonderful Tuesday morning, the happy news of success – starting in January 2018, the project will be funded for five years.

This will not only be a South African project. We have brought together an impressive team of scholars, with a wide range of expertise. Now we are scouting for academically dedicated and enthusiastic students to join us in writing this new biography. We offer bursaries from postdoc to Honours level. More information is available on the project website.

I am excited about what the newly transcribed information, currently hidden away in millions of unused documents, can reveal. I am excited about building a team of dedicated and brilliant young scholars, a team that can continue long after the five years funding term. And I am also excited to join a new faculty and department, encouraging inter-disciplinary research that will, hopefully, provide new insights into the lives of South Africans, present and past.

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How do we build a prosperous, decolonized South Africa?

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boys-plowing

I recently attended an academic conference at the University of the Free State on the topic ‘Decolonizing Africa’. Much of the debate was, understandably, about the past: about the lingering effects of the (Atlantic) slave trade, European colonization that included the imposition of largely artificial borders, and the post-colonial failures of independent Africa. But at the final keynote, delivered by Prof Alois Mlambo of the University of Pretoria, the discussion turned to the future. How do we build a prosperous, decolonized South Africa?

One unescapably emotive topic is land reform. The expropriation and dispossession of land in South Africa is the root, many agreed, of the severe levels of inequality that plague the region. But how to correct this past injustice was not so easy; in the audience, too, were several Zimbabwean scholars quite critical of that country’s land reform programme. Over lunch, one Zimbabwean student told me the tragic story of his grandfather, a former farm worker on a white farm turned successful tobacco farmer after land reform, only to lose his land because he was considered ‘too successful’ by the ruling ZANU-PF party. The farm is now dormant.

Getting land reform right is fraught with difficulty. Not everyone that suffered land expropriation wants to return to farming – by far the largest number of recipients of successful land claims in South Africa choose the cash instead of the land. (This is often ignored by politicians and commentators when simply taking the hectares transferred as measure of land reform success.)  And even when recipients choose to return to the land, they often struggle to support themselves because of the small size of land allocated, or a lack of capital investment, or a lack of technical or management skills. There are also political consequences: because land recipients, like those in Zimbabwe, often do not receive title deed to the land they are given, they become ensnared by the political party that gave them the land. Why do people still vote for ZANU-PF despite the state of the economy? Because they worry a vote for the opposition means that they might lose their land. Most worryingly, it is often the original farm workers who lose the most, like the Zimbabwean student’s grandfather.

This is not to say that some form of wealth redistribution is not imperative. But whereas land (and the minerals it contained) was clearly the most productive resource when it was expropriated in the nineteenth century (which is the reason it was expropriated), a valid question is whether it still is the most productive. Of course, people value land not only for its economic uses: there are a myriad of historic, cultural and religious reasons why the land of your ancestors are treasured. But as a redistributive policy aimed at creating a more equitable society, is land reform the best way to create prosperity for those who suffered historical injustice?

Think of the fastest growing companies globally: which of them still rely predominantly on land ownership? AirBnB is a great example: it is the world’s largest accommodation service, without owning any property! For AirBnB and the myriad other unicorns that have created incredible wealth for their founders and shareholders, it is not land or physical property that creates wealth, but science and technology. (Even farmers know this: that is why they are investing in science to improve their crops and in technology to mechanize production.)

In the twenty-first century, land is what you buy with your wealth, and not the reason for your wealth. A quip about Stellenbosch wine farmers summarize this well: How do you make R1 million farming in Stellenbosch? You spend R2 million.

Prof Mlambo remarked that India and China, both with a history of colonisation, is not growing at above 5% because they have redistributed land. They have prospered because they embraced science and technology. Consider this: in the 2015/2016 academic year, 328,547 Chinese students studied in the United States; only 1,813 South African students did. (If you account for population size, 7 times more Chinese than South Africans students study in the US.) Take South Korea, a country with roughly the same population size as South Africa: 61,007 South Koreans traveled to study in the US in 2015/2016, 33 times more than South Africa.

So how would a redistribution policy look that takes science and technology seriously? I don’t have the answers, but here are some suggestions. Most of us would agree that education is key, but the South African education system has not made much progress in the last decade and it is unlikely to do so in the next. Redistribution must start at the first year of life. Publicly funded but privately run nurseries will remove the gap between the rich and poor that has already emerged when kids arrive at school. For primary and secondary education, a voucher system that incentivize private schools for the poor is an option. At tertiary level, we need more and better-funded universities, notably in science and technology. (It would help to send more of our smartest students abroad to study at the frontiers of science – they will return with new ideas and networks to propel our industries forward.) Visas for and recruitment of skilled immigrants can boost research and entrepreneurship. Improve free wifi access and invest in renewable energies. The private sector, because that is where most innovation occur, can be incentivized through appropriate legislation to offer shares to workers – or to those living in communities where they operate. There are a myriad of innovative possibilities.

If Zimbabwe has taught us anything, it is that politics may triumph over economic logic. Land reform in Zimbabwe was not an economic strategy in as much as it was a strategy to keep the ruling party in power. It has had severe economic consequences, as anyone visiting Zimbabwe today can attest. The real radical economic transformations of our age – just in my lifetime, the Chinese has managed to reduce the share of people living in absolute poverty from 88% to less than 2% – have not come from redistributing an unproductive twenty-first century resource. It has instead been the result of investments in science and technology. Any attempt to redistribute with the purpose of building a more prosperous society should take this as the point of departure.

*An edited version of this first appeared in Finweek magazine of 29 June 2017.

The future of work: don’t fear the robots, embrace them

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Mugshot

One of the things of being an economist teaching at a university is that parents inevitably think you have a lot of insight about the future of the job market. What is the ‘safest’ programme, parents typically ask, that will guarantee Ryan or Samantha a well-paying job at the end of three years? Translated: How do I maximize the return on my investment?

As with any investment, there are risks. Not all university students graduate; a recent study on higher education pass-through rates – by Stellenbosch University’s Research in Social and Economic Policy (ReSEP)-unit – shows that less than 40% of South African students attain their degree within four years of starting (remember, most degrees are three-year programmes). Only 58% of students complete their degree within 6 years. (The numbers are particularly low at UNISA, a distance-learning university, where only 28% of students complete their degree within six years.) There is a good chance Ryan never completes his degree in the first place, leaving only debt, psychological scars and forgone income in the labour market behind. The researchers also find that, while matric marks are strongly correlated with access to university, they matter less for university success. Samantha may have been a bright spark in school, but that is no guarantee that she will be successful at university.

But what worries most parents about their investment is not so much the internal factors that lead to success (like getting Ryan to attend class, one of the most important determinants of success), but the external threats that may affect his chances of finding a job. The biggest culprit nowadays: robots.

The threat of robots is everywhere, it seems. Autonomous vehicles will soon substitute the most ubiquitous job of the twentieth century – taxi and truck drivers. Blue-collar jobs are first in the firing line, from farm labourers replaced by GPS-coordinated harvesters to postal workers replaced by, well, e-mail. But white collar work – which is often the domain of university graduates – will be soon to follow: lawyers, accountants, and middle-management, to name a few that have been singled out. Basically any job with repetitive tasks run the risk of robotification.

Parents are eager to know which job types are most likely to succumb to the robot overlords. If lawyers are of no use in the future, why study law? This is, of course, a reasonable concern. Several of the standard activities undertaken by lawyers are repetitive, easily-automatable. And artificial intelligence challenges even non-repetitive work: it allows software to search through large volumes of legal texts at a fraction of the time a paralegal would during the ‘discovery’ phase of a case. Not so fast, says Tim Bessen, an economist at the Boston University School of Law. He shows that, in the period that this software has spread through the US, the number of paralegals have increased by 1.1% per year. Because the costs of undertaking these ‘discovery’ services have fallen dramatically as a result of the new technology, the frequency of such services have increased even more, requiring more paralegals, not fewer.

It is not only that robots substitute existing repetitive work, it is that they can do it so much better. Although robots and their algorithms are not entirely objective – because algorithms adjust to human behaviour, they can often reinforce our prejudices – their biases tend to be more transparent and corrigible. A new NBER study shows just how robots could transform one of the oldest human professions – the judge – and in so doing realise huge societal benefits. The five authors, three computer scientists and two economists, want to know the following: can US judges’ decisions be improved by using a machine learning algorithm?

Every year, more than 10 million Americans are arrested. Soon after arrest, a judge must decide where defendants will await trail – at home or in jail. By law, judges should base their decision on the probability of the defendant fleeing or committing another murder. Whether the defendant is guilty or not should not enter this decision.

To investigate whether judges make fair decisions, the authors train a face recognition algorithm on a dataset of 758 027 defendants in New York City. They have detailed information about these defendants: whether they were released, whether they committed new crimes, etc. They then construct an algorithm to process the same information a judge would have at their disposal, and the algorithm then provides a prediction of the crime risk associated with each defendant.

Comparing their results to those of the judges, they find that an algorithm can have large welfare gains: a ‘policy simulation shows crime can be reduced by up to 24.8% with no change in jailing rates, or jail populations can be reduced by 42.0% with no increase in crime rates’. All categories of crime, including violent crimes, decline. The percentage of African-Americans and Hispanics in jail also fall significantly.

Will robots replace judges? Probably not – but the quality of judges’ decisions can be improved significantly by using robots. This will be true in most other skilled professions too, from law to management to academic economists like me.

Matriculants on the cusp of their careers (and their anxious investor-parents) have no reason to fear the coming of the robots. If Ryan and Samantha, regardless of their field-of-study, see them as complements – by learning their language, and how to collaborate with them – the benefits, for themselves and society-at-large, will be greater than the costs.

*An edited version of this first appeared in Finweek magazine of 4 May.

Written by Johan Fourie

May 26, 2017 at 09:33

Do CEOs deserve their high salaries?

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Whitey Basson

Late last year, Bloomberg reported that South African Chief Executive Officers earn the 7th most of any country in the world – a whopping R102 million per person per annum. This was equivalent to 541 times the income of an average South Africa. The study, understandably, caused some outrage.

These numbers have been disputed, mostly because they include CEOs who earn in foreign currency. A study by 21st Century Consultants found that the CEO salary of the median large cap South African firm in 2016 was less than R6 million, roughly 5% of the Bloomberg average. PwC found the median between R3.1 and R7.7 million.

But even at these lower levels, many ask whether CEOs deserve what they earn. Do the value that they add outweigh the millions spent on salaries and bonuses? This, of course, is an incredibly complex question. Economists have no laboratory where they can randomly assign CEOs their salaries, and see what the likely outcome might be. Instead, we have CEOs that respond to the firm’s internal and external demands in various ways, planning, strategizing, meeting and organizing. Which of these activities adds more value seems impossible to determine.

That is, until now. A new study by four economists – Oriana Bandiera (LSE), Stephen Hansen (Oxford), Andrea Prat (Columbia Business School) and Raffeala Sadun (Harvard Business School) – measure the behaviour of CEOs in Brazil, France, Germany, India, the UK and the US, and compare these measurements to their firm’s performance. They do this using a two-stage method: first, they collect the weekly diaries of 1114 CEOs in the six countries. These diaries include detailed information about the hourly activities of each CEO: with whom they met, the number and duration of plant/shop-floor visits, business lunches, how many people joined, and the functions of these participants (whether they were in finance or marketing, for example, or clients or suppliers).

Their finding is that CEO activities differ remarkably across firms. While CEOs spend most of their time in meetings, they ‘differ in the extent to which their focus is on firms’ employees vs outsiders, and within the former, whether they mostly interact with high-level executives vs. production employees’.

The authors then use a machine learning algorithm to create an index of CEO behaviour. At low values of the index, CEOs spend more time with production and in one-on-one meetings with employees and suppliers, and at high values CEOs spend more time with executives and in meetings with more participants.

The authors note that there is no theoretical reason for one type of behaviour to lead to better outcomes. That such different types of behaviour exist may just be a consequence of the fact that firms require different types of CEOs, i.e. some firms will do better with a low-index CEO while others would do better with a high-index CEO. When CEOs are perfectly matched – or ‘assigned’ – to the type of firm that suit their style, there should be no correlation between the index-value of a CEO and the firm’s performance. In other words, a low-index CEO matched to a firm that will benefit from a low-index CEO style would perform just as well as a high-index CEO matched to a firm that will benefit from this CEO style type.

The results, however, shows the opposite. High values on the CEO index are strongly correlated with higher firm productivity, a measure of firm performance. CEOs who spend most of their time in meetings with senior executives, engage in communication (phone calls, videoconferences, etc.), bring together inside and outside functions, and bring together more than one function of a kind are also more likely to lead more productive firms.

Their results also show that CEOs are often not matched to the right firm: “Our estimates indicate that, while low-index CEOs are optimal for some of the sample firms, their supply generally overstrips demand, such that 17% of the firms end up with the ‘wrong’ CEO.”

More importantly, it is in the two developing countries in their sample – Brazil and India – where this matching is especially bad: 36% of firms in those countries end up with the ‘wrong’ CEO compared to the only 5% in the four developed countries. “The productivity loss generated by the misallocation of CEOs to firms equals 13% of the labour productivity gap between high and low income countries”.

The authors do not speculate on why this difference exists. One likely reason is weaker competition for top jobs within a thinner talent pool owing to the unequal levels of education in these countries. Another may be that appointments happen for reasons other than merit.

What the study does show, though, is that the choice of CEO is critical for firm success. Appoint the wrong type of CEO, and productivity is likely to decline. Although some firms benefit from a CEO who frequently has one-on-one conversations and visits the production floor, most firms benefit from a CEO who spend their days leading large meetings with top executives from different fields.

That helps to explain the high salaries for CEOs in South Africa too. A mismatch between CEO and firm is costly and seems to happen quite frequently. The small talent pool means that most firms are willing to pay exceptional salaries to those rare individuals with a high CEO index-value. If they don’t, the firm is likely to suffer far more costly productivity losses.

It also points to the dangers of policies that hope to place an upper-bound on managerial remuneration. Lower levels of remuneration will likely lead to fewer CEOs with high index-value, and to higher levels of mismatch between CEOs and firms. That, as the authors show, will be devastating for firm-level productivity, and economic development. Beware the unintended consequences of policies made with good intentions.

*An edited version of this first appeared in Finweek magazine of 6 April.

Written by Johan Fourie

May 1, 2017 at 05:57

It’s five years!

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blog

Five years ago, on a warm January day, I started a blog. I tend to forget detail easily, but I somehow vividly remember sitting at my desk, squeezed into a bedroom that was also a living room and home office space, and watching a hawk land on the small balcony. They say you have to write about what you see, so that is how I started my first post.

It’s five years later. Life is different. Helanya and I have moved twice since that day. We’ve travelled. I’ve graduated my first (soon to be two) student(s). But we’ve been fortunate, too, in that many things have not changed at all. We’ve attended many baby showers and few funerals. We’ve gained wonderful new friends through travelling. My students keep on inspiring me. And my colleagues and co-authors continue to have too much patience.

My blog has remained, too, although a long-time reader would recognise some change. As with most new things, I was productive initially, writing 10 posts in my first month. I soon realised I couldn’t keep up the pace, and the frequency declined to average between four and six posts. I blogged about many things that interested me, but Economics-related topics seemed to take precedence.

At the beginning of last year, I was offered a contract to write a bi-weekly column for Finweek magazine. Due to time and (more importantly) idea constraints, I began to post my columns as posts instead of writing altogether new posts. The result has been that the length of my posts has increased, but that the frequency has declined. It also means that the average number of visitors per day has declined somewhat. I would like to think that there is a quality-quantity trade-off, though. There is some evidence to support this claim: the number of permanently registered readers has continued to increase.

It’s strange to reread some of the posts that I wrote several years ago. They are recognisably me, but they are also different from how I would write about the same topic now. I guess that means that I’m learning. Or unlearning.

Or just growing older.

Blogging is a difficult business these days. What I had hoped to do when I started was to debate, to challenge, to offer a different, sometimes unpopular, perspective. But I have become less eager to do this, probably because I have lost some of my youthful big-eyed optimism, but mostly because of the uncritical social media platforms that now dominate public debate.

blog2017

I would like to think the blog has had some impact, though. My 258 (this will the the 259th) posts have attracted 295 659 visitors to my site, who’ve read my posts 417 095 times. That is an unfathomable number, and much more than I could have hoped for. The large number is largely the result of one post I wrote – Why and what to study in South Africa – which I wrote in May 2013 and has since received more than 156 000 views. It also has 251 comments. The most views in one day actually come from a book review about Ken Follett’s Century trilogy. He retweeted the blog post, and I was swamped by visitors. Most of them were there for the images of the characters, which I had borrowed from someone else (with due credit, fortunately.) My favourite post? There are many that I like (of course), but I think the one that stands out is my response to Zuma’s remarks at the beginning of 2015.

***

This morning the Stellenbosch heavens finally opened up for some much-needed rain. I hear doves cooing, playing in the temporary ponds in our new flower bed. Perhaps they are descendants of the chicks that hatched five summers ago… (but then this will likely be the third or even fourth generation, as Google tells me that doves only have a 1.5-year lifespan in the wild.) It’s the start of a new year, a time when we tend to look to the future. And I wonder: Where will we be in another five years’ time?

Written by Johan Fourie

January 27, 2017 at 10:28

It’s the sixth AEHN meetings!

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Stellenbosch PhD student Abel Gwaindepi presenting his research at last year's AEHN meetings

Stellenbosch PhD student Abel Gwaindepi presenting his research at last year’s AEHN meetings

This week the University of Sussex hosts the sixth African Economic History Network meetings. I’ve just arrived in Brighton for what will be a full programme of conferencing on Friday and Saturday, and meetings and discussions in-between. Our hosts, Alex Moradi and Felix Meier zu Selhausen, have done a splendid job of attracting more than 60 high-quality papers from a wide spectrum of economists and historians working on the African past. The full programme is available here.

This is an important moment for the field. Having grown rapidly over the last few years as younger scholars (mostly from Europe) embrace the field of quantitative African economic history, the annual meeting now provides a platform for many of them to showcase their work. Their passion and enterprise have uncovered new data sources, which have challenged long-held beliefs about topics like precolonial inequality, the economic causes underpinning the Scramble for Africa, the effects of missionary education, fiscal regimes, and many more.

But this can only be a beginning. As debates about decolonising curricula within South African universities raise legitimate concerns about challenging a Eurocentric view of African development, the challenge for the Network and for the broader research community is to expand the pool of researchers using these new sources and methods. African economic history, as I’ve written before, is a wonderful tool to contextualise the often ahistorical and acontextual economic theories that are the bedrock of economics courses. And while these formal models are necessary to allow students to evaluate economic policies and communicate their findings to an international audience, their interpretations must be informed by local histories and conditions. That is what a quantitative African economic history can do.

To dismiss the immense contribution the new breed of African economic historians that will congregate in Sussex has made is senseless. These scholars have spent many years reading and researching the African past, digitising precious historical sources, analysing trends and interpreting the African past based on new empirical results. These efforts have often also been associated with significant financial resources, which have allowed many sources to remain in the public domain. They have also written textbooks that are downloadable for free to African students.

My hope is that more African scholars can become participants in and contributors to these debates. Funding remains an issue, but so too a demand from African students. It would be wonderful, for example, to see more Masters dissertations at South African universities on African economic history questions. This is not always the students’ fault. As one of my own students recently reminded me, it is the responsibility of academic staff to instil in students an interest in the important and often difficult (and contentious) research questions of our time. What were the causes and consequences of slavery and colonialism in its many dimensions? Of colonial infrastructure and education? Of the IMF structural adjustment programmes and the debt cancellation and development aid? Of immigration and emigration? Of natural resources and sovereign wealth funds? Of genetically modified crops and robotics?

Hopefully the AEHN meetings at Sussex this week will pose some of these important and difficult questions. And when the seventh African Economic History Network meetings come around next year (in Stellenbosch), we will have a large pool of African students contributing answers – and new questions.

I, Krotoa

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Krotoa

Last Friday at around noon, I ended a class on European settlement at the Cape and the demise of the Khoesan by lamenting the lack of public acknowledgement for some of the Cape’s most famous Khoe inhabitants. Autshumao was one of the first translators and interlopers between the trading Dutch and local Khoesan clans. Gonnema was a proud leader of the Cochoqua, who fought the Dutch in three Khoe-Dutch Wars. And then there was Krotoa, Autshumao’s niece, who was brought up by the Van Riebeecks. Here is her short Wikipedia bio:

On 3 May 1662 Krotoa was baptised by a visiting parson, minister Petrus Sibelius, in the church inside the Fort de Goede Hoop. The witnesses were Roelof de Man and Pieter van der Stael. On 26 April 1664 she married a Danish surgeon by the name of Peter Havgard, whom the Dutch called Pieter van Meerhof. She was thereafter known as Eva van Meerhof. She was the first Khoikoi to marry according to Christian customs. There was a little party in the house of Zacharias Wagenaer. In May 1665, they left the Cape and went to Robben Island, where van Meerhof was appointed superintendent. The family briefly returned to the mainland in 1666 after the birth of Krotoa’s third child, in order to baptize the baby. Van Meerhoff was murdered on Madagascar on 27 February 1668 on an expedition.

Krotoa returned to the mainland on 30 September 1668 with her children. Suffering from alcoholism, she left the Castle in the settlement to be with her family in the kraals. In February 1669 she was imprisoned at the Castle and then banished to Robben Island. She returned to the mainland on many occasions just to find herself once more banished to Robben Island. In May 1673 she was allowed to baptise a child on the mainland. Three of her children survived infancy. She died on 29 July 1674 in the Cape and was buried on 30 September 1674 in the church in the Fort,

Pieternella and Salamon, Krotoa’s two youngest children from her marriage to van Meerhof, were taken to Mauritius in 1677. Pieternella, who was known as Pieternella Meerhof or Pieternella van die Kaap, later married Daniel Zaaijman, a VOC vegetable farmer from Vlissingen. They had four sons and four daughters, one of whom was named Eva, and the family moved back to the Cape in 1706.

I ended my class by suggesting the students consider these local figures when they think about renaming campus buildings, as had happened last year during the #FeesMustFall movement. What I had not known, was that at that exact moment, Krotoa’s spirit was returned to the Castle of Good Hope where her remains had been removed from a century ago. Here’s the news report:

Gathered around a tree at the Groote Kerk, they [traditional and religious leaders] burned an incense plant and beckoned for her soul to rise from the unmarked grave where her bones had been held.

Her remains had been removed from the grounds of the Castle of Good Hope, nearly a century after she was buried there.

On Friday, some of her descendants returned with her spirit to the castle.

A few months ago, after uncovering an old computer file that contained my genealogy, I discovered that the wife of my paternal great-grandfather – Wynand Breytenbach Fourie – was one Johanna Beatrix Fourie. Her maiden name: Zaaiman.

Many other South Africans also descend from Krotoa. It is in the math – here’s Stephen Fry on the topic. Almost all white South Africans today must have some non-European heritage, given the women of Khoe or slave (especially) origin who married Dutch or German or French (or, in Krotoa’s case, Danish) men at an early stage in the country’s history.

Although several novels have appeared that feature her – most famously Dan Sleigh’s Eilande and Dalene Matthee’s Pieternella van die Kaap – Krotoa, and the tumultuous times she lived in, has been largely neglected from popular discourse. Fortunately, that is changing. In the ceremony on Friday, she was variously described as a child labourer, a feminist, and a language fighter who helped create Afrikaans, even a martyr. An Afrikaans/Nama movie that feature her life is now in post-production stage. Armand Aucamp plays Jan van Riebeeck and Crystal Donna Roberts an older Krotoa.

But more should certainly be done. Monuments and renamed buildings and public places can play a role, but because Krotoa’s story is claimed by so many (as Heritage Consulatant Tracy Randle explains in this interview), these memorials will remain contested. Some activitists protested outside the Castle on Friday, for example. Last year, a bench which had Krotoa’s face engraved in mosaic art, and which was located at Krotoa Place, the small square at the intersection of Castle Street and St George’s Mall, was destroyed.

Much like 350 years ago, Krotoa embodies the tragedy and disillusionment but also the hopes and aspirations of our fractured society. Unshackled to anyone or any group, hers is our story.

Or, as Lara Kirsten observes in her poem Vir Krotoa (For Krotoa):

in haar skyn die hoop
wat nog by ons mense spook

(in her shines the hope that still frightens our people)

Written by Johan Fourie

August 25, 2016 at 08:46